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Abstract
Reporting and learning systems are key organisational tools for the management and prevention of clinical risk. However,
current approaches, such as incident reporting, are struggling to meet expectations of turning health systems like the UK
National Health Service (NHS) into learning organisations. This article aims to open up debate on the potential for novel
reporting and learning systems in healthcare, by reflecting on experiences from two recent projects: Proactive Risk
Monitoring in Healthcare (PRIMO) and Errordiary in Healthcare. These two approaches demonstrate how paying
attention to ordinary, everyday clinical work can derive useful learning and active discussion about clinical risk. We
argue that innovations in reporting and learning systems might come from both inside and outside of the box. ‘Inside’
being along traditional paths of controlled organisational innovation. ‘Outside’ in the sense that inspiration comes outside
of the healthcare domain, or more extremely, outside official channels through external websites and social media (e.g.
patient forums, public review sites, whistleblower blogs and Twitter streams). Reporting routes that bypass official
channels could empower staff and patient activism, and turn out to be a driver to challenge organisational processes,
assumptions and priorities where the organisation is failing and has become unresponsive.
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Introduction
Policy makers widely acknowledge that modern health-
care systems may inﬂict preventable harm on
patients.1,2 It is commonly suggested that around 1 in
10 patients admitted to hospitals around the world will
suﬀer an adverse event, and that as many as half of
these may be preventable.3 This causes needless harm
to patients, and it represents an unnecessary additional
ﬁnancial burden on healthcare systems. In the UK, it
has been estimated that preventable adverse events
could cost the NHS 1bn annually in additional bed
days, alone.4 The costs to the NHS associated with
adverse drug events are estimated to be around
0.5bn–1.9bn annually.5
In the UK, the National Reporting and Learning
System (NRLS) was set up following the publication
of the inﬂuential report ‘An Organisation With
A Memory’ by the Department of Health.1 NRLS is
a national incident reporting system that aims to sys-
tematically capture data about incidents in the NHS,
and to provide an indication of the extent and the
nature of harm that patients suﬀer in the NHS.
The report also highlighted that the NHS needed to
progress from a culture of blame towards an open,
fair and just culture. Fear of punishment following
errors represents a fundamental barrier to reporting,
thus undermining this essential mechanism to enhan-
cing patient safety. For example, the investigation
into the Bristol Royal Inﬁrmary deaths identiﬁed a deﬁ-
cient safety culture as a causal factor.6 More recently,
the Francis report of the Mid Staﬀordshire Public
Inquiry provided similar ﬁndings about a culture that
was contributing to poor standards of care.7
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Over the past 10 years, the NHS has adopted
incident reporting as one of the key instruments for
organisational learning.8–10 In addition to NRLS,
which operates at a national level, organisations can
also operate their own local incident reporting systems.
The thinking behind incident reporting is that the ana-
lysis of reported incidents can oﬀer valuable lessons
about vulnerabilities in healthcare systems and about
deﬁcient organisational processes, which can reveal
latent conditions for incidents.11,12 Such contributory
factors can then be addressed before they combine to
cause harm to patients.
The NRLS has had some impact in form of Rapid
Response Reports, Patient Safety Alerts and Safer
Practice Notices that raise awareness of system vulner-
abilities based on analyses of incident report data.
It was hoped that the role of the NRLS in improving
patient safety would be as signiﬁcant as that of the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) has been
in the aviation sector. However, it has been suggested
that NRLS has not achieved these aspirations.13
Research has provided insights into the barriers to suc-
cessful learning from incident reporting, and the limi-
tations of such an approach to organisational learning
in the NHS. Barriers include lack of training in the use
of incident reporting, usability problems of the systems
that are used for reporting, uncertainty about
what constitutes a reportable incident, blame culture
and fear of consequences, lack of feedback and
the absence of learning relevant to local practices.14–17
A major weakness of many incident reporting systems
in the NHS is that they produce little actual change.18
The perceived lack of learning and absence of relevance
to the local work environment may have a detrimental
impact on the willingness of staﬀ to contribute to
incident reporting.19 This suggests that further research
is required to develop approaches to organisational
learning, which can complement incident reporting,
and which are able to engage staﬀ and generate action-
able learning.20
Learning from the ordinary
Organisational learning within the NHS relies largely
on information derived from the analysis of serious
untoward incidents and other harm events. In this
respect, organisations are directing the focus of their
learning on extraordinary (i.e. low frequency) events
that cause patient harm. It is undoubtedly very import-
ant to understand what went wrong following any
event where patients were harmed, but questions
can be asked as to whether this is the only, or indeed,
the best route into gathering information for improving
the quality and safety of services. The problem with
learning from such extraordinary events is that they
frequently carry negative connotations of human
error and blame. As a result, reporting is often done
‘to cover oneself’ rather than to contribute to organisa-
tional learning, and the events that get reported are typ-
ically restricted to well-known occurrences, such as
patient falls. This limits the amount of useful informa-
tion that can be generated by these approaches.
Within the Health Foundation project PRIMO
(Proactive Risk Monitoring in Healthcare), an alterna-
tive (and complementary) approach to organisational
learning was developed that aims to elicit a rich con-
textual picture of the local work environment, to move
away from negative and threatening notions of errors
and mistakes, and to encourage active participation
and ownership with clear feedback for local work prac-
tices.21,22 The distinguishing feature of the PRIMO
approach is that it focuses on learning from the ordin-
ary, in this case the various hassles that practitioners
experience in their everyday clinical work.
PRIMO is intended to be operated by local teams,
e.g. the hospital pharmacy or individual wards. Staﬀ
are asked to contribute free-text narratives about some-
thing that caused them hassle during their working week.
These staﬀ narratives are anonymised and de-identiﬁed,
and are entered into an electronic platform. The local
PRIMO champion will do a preliminary analysis of each
narrative, extracting both underlying causal factors, such
as inadequate equipment, as well as the symptoms of
these factors in the work environment, i.e. the actual
hassle that people experience, such as having to spend
excessive amounts of time chasing missing equipment. In
this way, information is gathered from frontline staﬀ
about contributory factors that might at some point
lead to patient harm if left unaddressed.
The beneﬁt of learning from the ordinary hassle of
everyday clinical work is that staﬀ are usually very
happy to report and to discuss these, because there
is no fear of blame involved, and because staﬀ would
like to see their work environment improved. A further
beneﬁt is that some of the ordinary hassle can be
addressed with limited resources and within a reasonable
amount of time. This lends itself to create ownership
among groups of staﬀ, who can take responsibility for
addressing and improving some of the hassle that has
been identiﬁed. For example, in a hospital, dispensary
staﬀ reported that there was little space for pharmacists
to do the ﬁnal checking of medications. The local team
then took this on, and the work environment
was reorganised to create a dedicated space for this pur-
pose.20,21 While it is important to address the underlying
factors that might contribute to adverse events, this usu-
ally takes longer and is slow to show improvements at
the local level. Focusing also on addressing the symptoms
(i.e. the hassle) can contribute to engaging staﬀ in the
continuous improvement of safety and quality.
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One of the hall-marks of the so-called High
Reliability Organisations is that they keep the discus-
sion about risk and safety going even in the absence
of adverse events.23 Within PRIMO, the electronic plat-
form oﬀers the opportunity for staﬀ to review all of the
narratives, and to vote on both the extent of hassle they
experience from symptoms as well as on the presence of
the underlying factors using a social-media style ‘like’
approach. In this way, PRIMO might contribute
towards building a community-based discussion of
patient safety issues in the local work environment.
The evaluation of PRIMO in a radiology depart-
ment and a surgical emergency assessment unit suggests
that PRIMO can generate actionable learning that
feeds into visible improvements in the work environ-
ment.22 Experience from implementing the PRIMO
approach over a 12-month period in the two diverse
settings further suggests that there are a number of
common prerequisites that greatly inﬂuence the extent
to which the PRIMO approach, as well as any other
organisational learning tool, can contribute to success-
ful proactive organisational learning and improvement.
The identiﬁed and inter-related prerequisites are
engagement by frontline staﬀ, the composition of the
improvement team, which needs to be suﬃciently broad
encompassing diﬀerent staﬀ roles, the buy-in and sup-
port from senior management, and the readiness of the
organisation for quality and safety improvement.
Learning by disrupting notions of the
extraordinary
‘Serious untoward incidents’ and ‘never events’ have
been adopted as labels to describe the most serious
events in the NHS, which often result in patient harm
and which should not have happened. This language
emphasises the gravity and rarity of the event.
This same language arguably provides some reassur-
ance to staﬀ and patients that these events are extraor-
dinary, and unlikely to happen here, to me.
An alternative label from the safety literature, which
provides a controversial substitute for a ‘never event’, is
the ‘normal accident’.24 Perrow coined this term to
describe how the myriad of small everyday disturb-
ances, which are considered normal on their own, can
coalesce to produce an accident. His thesis proposes
that in complex systems these small disturbances are
unavoidable, and eventually they will coalesce to lead
to an accident. ‘Normal accident’ captures how nothing
out of the ordinary caused the accident along the way,
and it is only the normal disturbances coalescing which
leads to the more remarkable outcome.
In a similar way, Errordiary in Healthcare also
attempts to challenge notions of the extraordinary
error, and provide an opportunity to debate normal
risks with clinicians. Errordiary in Healthcare is a
UCL Public Engagement Project, which invited clinical
professionals, patients and the public to submit exam-
ples of error to an open public website. These contri-
butions can be submitted directly through the website
or by including the hashtag ‘#errordiary’ through
Twitter. Over 130 volunteers have contributed to the
Errordiary project so far with over 2,700 examples of
error.25 These errors can be funny, frustrating or fatal.
Workshops based on this work provide opportunity for
learning through juxtaposing serious and less serious
cases, e.g. mixing up similarly looking hair spray and
body spray cans compared to mixing up similarly look-
ing dye and glue bottles in surgery.26 Even though their
outcomes are vastly diﬀerent (hairspray on your body
Figure 1. System dynamics model – the system is maintained under control by counterbalancing disturbances (upward arrows)
with resilient behaviours (downward arrows).
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compared to a patient fatality) similar psychological
causes can be attributed to these errors.27 Discussion
about funny and everyday error can raise debate
about more serious types in a non-threatening way,
and increase mindfulness that these errors could
happen here, to me, and to you.
Learning from ‘going right’ rather than
from ‘going wrong’
So far, the work we have discussed on reporting and
learning systems has revolved around diﬀerent notions
of incidents, hassles and disturbances. This reﬂects a
preoccupation of putting right what appears to be fail-
ing or going wrong. However, taking inspiration from
Resilience Engineering28 and the emerging notion of
Safety-II29 (deﬁned as the ability to succeed), we can
also enhance safety management by fostering what a
system does right and how it maintains performance
despite vulnerability and adversity. The system dynam-
ics can be visualised as shown in Figure 1, where resili-
ent forms of behaviour support maintaining control of
care delivery in the face of disruptive forces, such as
lack of equipment or inadequate staﬃng levels.17
Both, PRIMO and Errordiary lend themselves to pro-
viding insights about how healthcare professionals
deliver safe care in the face of disturbances and disrup-
tions. Within PRIMO, the narratives that staﬀ submit
often contain not only descriptions of hassle, but also
descriptions of how staﬀ coped with the hassle. Such
coping mechanisms or resilient forms of behaviour
often include the sharing of information and personal
negotiation to create a shared awareness, prioritisation
of activities, and oﬀering and seeking help.30 Errordiary
also collects examples of resilience strategies, i.e. strate-
gies used to minimise the likelihood or consequences of
error.31 For example, strategies for taking medication
include setting alarms, diﬀerentiating similar looking
pills and having spare medication at work as well as at
home.32 Workshops on this work also provide oppor-
tunity for learning through comparing similar cases, e.g.
using coloured key rings to diﬀerentiate keys is similar to
labelling intravenous infusion lines, so lines that lead to a
patient can be easily identiﬁed.26 There is a possibility
that sharing local and community relevant resilience
strategies could help reduce clinical risk. Errordiary
can be considered an embryonic architecture, in struc-
ture and concepts, for such a system. With incident
reporting such learning typically is not available. This
is because incidents represent situations that have
broken down, i.e. situations where the coping strategies
have proved insuﬃcient to maintain the system (or care
delivery process) under control. However, looking
at ordinary, everyday clinical work allows a better
understanding of the system dynamics at play.
Innovations outside of the box
Innovations in reporting and learning systems can
come from diﬀerent threats and opportunities inside
and outside of normal organisational structures.
Policy and the need for organisational learning can
drive the development and implementation of internal
reporting and learning systems, as was the case with
the NRLS. However, looking ahead we see a greater
role for reporting systems outside of the organisational
structure, which might bypass oﬃcial channels
and restrictions. Trends in other areas allude to devel-
opments, mostly facilitated by the aﬀordances of
modern technology. For example, patient and staﬀ
activism can be more easily operationalised through
social media and blogs. Similar to how a schoolgirl
captured public attention by blogging about the poor
standard of her school dinners,1 patients and staﬀ could
campaign against poor nutritional standards or other
failing standards of institutions. External quality
reporting and rating systems are rife in the product
and service industry, like TripAdvisor2; further
research could investigate whether these informal and
external rating systems could be a model for the health
service. Similar systems that rate individuals, such as
ratemyprofessor,3 might be applied to GPs, dentists
and other healthcare professionals. Also, systems are
now in place to give a voice to disgruntled staﬀ, an
extreme example of which is WikiLeaks.4 Such systems
might facilitate staﬀ raising concerns about patient care
where they feel unable to do so through organisational
channels, which could have been useful in relation to
the Mid Staﬀordshire case.
A further area where additional research is required
is in understanding the factors that enable or inhibit
the successful implementation of such approaches to
organisational learning. Approaches to evaluation
rooted in realism emphasise the need to understand
the mechanisms and the context of change.33 Stevens
emphasises the importance of context in improvement
reports highlighting the need for reﬂection of the
interaction between improvement strategy and the
unique context.34 Further research should, therefore,
aim to identify and describe the factors that contribute
to successful organisational learning across a range of
diﬀerent settings.
Conclusion
Healthcare providers should seek out alternative
approaches to complement their established organisa-
tional learning processes. Examples of approaches that
focus on everyday clinical work have already been
developed and tested. Other examples can be found
outside of the health sector, and this could provide
inspiration for healthcare-speciﬁc learning processes.
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How organisations respond to these external reporting
mechanisms, whether they perceive them as a threat or
opportunity, and how they embrace learning from
this remain to be seen, but there is an opportunity for
both policy makers and researchers to look to these
developments and formulate and test potential lessons
for healthcare.
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